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1 Introduction
Modern economic theory aims to investigate social and economic phenomena referring to
agents’ choices. To this end an assumption on their preferences is mandatory. The classical
hypothesis is that it is possible to represent agents’ preferences with a utility function
defined on consumption goods - e.g. consumer theory, general equilibrium paradigm - or
other items related to agent’s behavior - e.g. effort, habit, etc..
According to this view, preferences are mostly exogenous and fixed. This approach
is flexible enough to model different situations but recently a mounting evidence has
shown its intrinsic limits in several fields (economics, sociology, anthropology, political
science, psychology). We recall two main issues: agent’s preferences are also defined on
the behavior of the others; preferences are not fixed and exogenous, they evolve over time
and are influenced by the agent’s experience and the choices of the society as a whole,
e.g. altruism, interdependent utilities, habit formation, network effects, externalities, see
Bowles (1998), Sobel (2005), Akerlof and Kranton (2005). The behavior of other agents
enters the utility function and influences tastes.
This evidence leads to go beyond self-interest as the unique motivation of the agents’
behavior and the representation of preferences by a utility function of the quantity of
the goods consumed by the agent. Preferences may include many different items and
the maximization of the utility may produce results far away from the classical pure
individualistic behavior. This is the case of choices that have social consequences: the
choice has a private value for the agent and a social dimension with externalities on the
behavior of the other agents. Analyzing social decisions, two features of agents’ preferences
turn out to be relevant: reputation and identity.
Reputation has been extensively analyzed in the literature. Going back to classical
contributions, Veblen (1899) pointed out that economic behavior and preferences are in-
fluenced by the behavior of the others: agents care of their status, they desire prestige and
esteem and therefore they are sensitive to social acceptance and reputation which induce
them to conform to the behavior of the others. In the recent literature this intuition
has been modeled in several different perspectives (learning, signaling, technology exter-
nalities), and in particular assuming a taste externality (individuals care directly about
status, popularity, esteem, respect), see Akerlof (1980), Jones, (1984), Bernheim (1994),
Akerlof (1997), Brock and Durlauf (2001). In this case, reputation is modeled through a
utility function that positively depends on the fact that the agent’s behavior agrees with
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that of the population. In this setting, social customs arise from the maximization of
the utility function because deviation is punished by a loss of reputation and the social
interaction outcome may be different from the pure individualistic aggregate behavior.
Pareto (1920) argued that utility is not only driven by tastes but also by identity and
norms. The difference is subtle but important: tastes are not necessarily fixed, they may
evolve over time but they are usually taken as fixed when the agent takes a decision or an
action; norms and identity instead concern a mix of ingredients (social category, status,
ideal) and introduce prescriptions on agent’s behavior and on the behavior of the others
(how they should behave) with a feedback effect on the agent’s identity and on his utility.
For some attempts to model identity see Stigler and Becker (1977), Akerlof (1980), Akerlof
and Kranton (2000, 2005), Akerlof (2007), Akerlof and Kranton (2008, 2010), Cont and
Lo¨we (2010). We observe an internalization of rules of behavior representing the identity
or the ego of the agent with identity based payoff derived from the agent’s action or from
others’ actions, see Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
In this paper we consider a binary choice model (random utility) in a dynamic setting
taking into account both reputation and identity. Evaluating an action the agent considers
its coherence with his identity and his reputation (or social acceptance) in the society
taking the behavior of the whole population as a benchmark. Preferences are affected by
coherence with respect to the identity of the agent and by conformism with respect to the
behavior of the society. Starting from a random utility function a` la Brock and Durlauf
(2001), where conformism is already considered, we introduce identity and coherence in
the utility. We model identity based payoffs derived from the action of the agent: as
observed in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), an agent experiences anxiety (and a loss in
the utility) when he doesn’t obey to the rule prescribed by his identity. The analysis
is completed by a law of motion of the identity. Identity is affected both by the agent
behavior (action driven identity) and/or by the behavior of the society (society driven
identity). In the first case the agent looks at his choice to discover his “ego”, in the
second case he is influenced by the behavior of economy. In the first case we have an
individualistic identity formation in the second case we have that identity is influenced
by the others. We also extend our analysis to an identity driven by the private utility.
The closest papers to our are Akerlof (1980), Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2008). In a
model on social customs and unemployment, Akerlof (1980) considers both a reputation
loss from disobeying to the code of honor that depends on the fraction of people believing
in the code and a the loss of utility from disobeying the code of honor by a believer in the
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code: the standard equilibrium always exists, an equilibrium with unemployment with
labor-capital exchange at the code of honor exists if either the reputation effect or the
loss from non coherence are large enough. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) provide a setting
similar to our with an utility function that depends on the behavior of the society and
on the identity with an identity function that depends on agents’ actions, see Akerlof and
Kranton (2008) for an application to contract theory. Our model can be interpreted as a
dynamic version of their model.
We show that social interaction with conformism-reputation and coherence-identity
may be different from the pure individualistic society (pure private utility with no inter-
action) and from a model based on conformism-reputation inspired by Brock and Durlauf
(2001). In an individualistic society we have a unique equilibrium, in a model with con-
formism we may have one or three equilibria when reputation plays a relevant role or noise
is limited. In the latter case the outcome is a polarized society with fads that looks very
different from a society with a pure individualistic behavior. Coherence and an identity
driven by the choice of the agent and not by those of the population contrast conformism:
if coherence weight is large enough in the utility compared to that of reputation and co-
herence is affected mainly by the agent’s behavior - and not by the behavior of the society
- then social interaction leads to a unique (stable) equilibrium which coincides with the
pure individualistic society.
We apply our methodology to sequential voting when voters like to win, see Callander
(2007, 2008). In this setting voters observe a private signal on the value of the two
candidates and vote in random order observing also the votes expressed by the others.
They are influenced by the private signal, by ideology and by the vote of the society. We
show that precise signals and a strong desire to vote for the winner lead the agents to
vote independently of the value of the candidates with a large majority.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce agent’s preferences
considering a random utility function with conformism and coherence. In Section 3 we
model the identity formation. In Section 4 we analyze stationary equilibria of the model.
In Section 5 we analyze model with identity driven by private utility. In Section 6 we
apply our methodology to sequential voting.
4
2 Identity and Reputation in a binary choice model
We analyze how identity and reputation affect agent’s choices in a random utility model
a` la Brock and Durlauf (2001). The economy is made up of I agents facing a discrete
binary choice problem for all t ≥ 0. There are only two possible choices labeled −1 and
+1. We denote by ωi(t) ∈ {−1; 1}, where i = 1, ..., I and t ≥ 0, the choice of the i − th
agent at time t and by ω(t) = (ω1(t), ..., ωI(t)) the vector of the state variables, i.e.,
agents’ choices at time t.
We develop our analysis in two steps. First, we introduce the agent’s utility incor-
porating identity and reputation, then we analyze the dynamics of the entire population
choices in a continuous time setting. Presenting the static problem we omit the time
indicator t.
The agent’s choice enters the agent’s utility through three different channels. As in the
classical setting, we have the monetary value/utility associated with the specific choice
(private utility). Preferences are also characterized by two further features: introspection
and conformism. Introspection is modeled assuming that the agent compares his behav-
ior with his identity and gets a reward from the coherence of his behavior and what is
established by the identity. The mechanism is as follows: the agent internalizes rules of
behavior that are captured by the identity which prescribes a certain behavior and the
agent is rewarded by adopting a coherent behavior. The second feature concerns the fact
that the agent compares his behavior with the behavior of the economy as a whole and he
gets a benefit from behaving (or not) as the majority of the population does. In this case
preferences are affected by conformism or an antisocial attitude (anticonformism) with
respect to the behavior of the majority of the population.
In this setting, agent’s preferences are endogenous and in particular the agent compares
his choice with what the others do and with his norm-identity. We have to build a
benchmark for the behavior of the society and for the identity. As far as the behavior of
the society is concerned, we assume that the agent takes the expectation of the average of
the choices of the economy as a proxy of the behavior of the society, i.e., agent i considers
m¯ei =
1
I−1E[
∑
j 6=i ωj] as a sufficient statistics on the choices of the economy as a whole.
As far as the agent’s identity is concerned, we consider the binary variable Ji ∈ {−1; 1}.
At this stage of our analysis we consider the agent’s identity as an exogenous constant,
the next Section is devoted to its law of motion and to its evolution. We assume that the
identity Ji is strictly related to the choice ωi and, without loss of generality, we assume
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that if the agent’s identity is Ji = 1 (−1) then he should take the decision ωi = 1 (−1).
In these cases we say that the agent acts coherently: identity Ji = 1 prescribes ωi = 1,
identity Ji = −1 prescribes ωi = −1.
In a random additive utility setting, these features are fully described by the following
utility function:
ui(ωi) = v(ωi) + γωiJi + α
ωωim¯
e
i + ²(ωi). (1)
v(ωi) is the private utility function associated with the binary choice. Private utility
only depends upon the choice made by the agent and can be interpreted as the monetary
value associated with that particular choice. To simplify the analysis we assume that
agents have the same private utility, we can allow for heterogeneity in the private utility
at the cost of computational problems.
γωiJi captures the utility that the agent gets by comparing his behavior with his
identity. Let γ > 0. If sign(ωi) = sign(Ji) then the agent is coherent, his behavior agrees
with the prescriptions of his identity and therefore he gets a reward in terms of utility.
The magnitudo of this component is provided by γ. This way to introduce an interaction
between identity and behavior is similar to Akerlof (1980). The main difference is that
he only considers a loss for an agent who believes in a code of behavior but disobeys to
his prescriptions, no loss occurs in the case of an agent who obeys the code but doesn’t
believe in its social value, in our setting instead the loss is symmetric, i.e., when Ji and
ωi have different sign.
αωωim¯
e
i captures the utility that the agent gets comparing his behavior with that
of the economy as a whole. Conformism is introduced assuming directly an externality
on preferences, see Bernheim (1994) for a motivation. Assuming αω > 0 we have con-
formism. if sign(ωi) = sign(m¯
e
i ) then the agent gets a benefit from the fact that his
behavior conforms with that of the majority of the population. Assuming αω < 0 we have
anticonformism or an antisocial attitude. The magnitudo of the externality is captured
by |αω|. Note that this feature of preferences is already captured by the classical random
utility function model, see Brock and Durlauf (2001). A positive αω leads to strategic
complementarities as in Cooper and John, (1988): the marginal utility associated with
an action increases with the average action taken by the population. This formulation
captures a social component which is negatively affected by the distance between the
agent’s behavior and the average behavior of the population, as a matter of fact the met-
ric −J
2
(ωi − m¯ei )2 can be written as Jωim¯ei − Ji2 (1 + (m¯ei )2) which differs from (1) only in
the level while utility dependency on the agent’s choice coincides. This way to introduce
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conformism in the utility function is similar to the “conformist model” proposed by Ak-
erlof (1997), to the reputation function considered in Akerlof (1980), i.e., the loss from
disobeying to the code of behavior that depends on the fraction of people believing in the
code.
²(ωi) is a random term whose distribution is extreme value, i.e.,
P (²(−1)− ²(1) ≤ x) = 1
1 + e−βωx
. (2)
βω > 0 is a measure of the impact of the random component in the decision process. A
large βω means that the deterministic part plays a relevant role in the maximization of the
utility; instead when βω tends to zero the error term dominates and the choice between
ω = 1 or ω = −1 becomes a coin tossing. The error component can be interpreted as a
bounded rationality component on the behavior of the agents: agents are nearly rational
in the sense that their behavior can differ from the optimal one by a noise term.
Let h = 1
2
(v(1)− v(−1)). When h > 0 the choice ω = 1 leads to a higher private value
and therefore ω = 1 is risk-dominant in the sense that the agent is more likely to choose
ω = 1 instead of ω = −1.
At time t agent i observes his specific noise realization (²(1), ²(−1)) and takes the
decision (−1 or 1) comparing ui(1) to ui(−1) on the basis of his expectation on the
behavior of the population (m¯ei ): if ui(1) > ui(−1), then ωi = 1 and ωi = −1 otherwise.
As the environment is stochastic the choice is non deterministic and satisfies a probability
law. Thanks to (2) it can be shown that the agent’s choice obeys the probability
P (ωi| m¯ei ) =
eβ
ωωi(h+γJi+αωm¯ei)
e−β
ωωi(h+γJi+αωm¯ei) + eβ
ωωi(h+γJi+αωm¯ei)
. (3)
The analysis of the model calls for an assumption on agents’ expectations m¯ei . We
can address this issue in a static setting or introducing a dynamics. In the first case the
natural candidate is the rational expectations hypothesis: agents possess homogeneous
expectations on the average behavior of the population and this hypothesis is consistent
with the outcome of the model: the expectation on the average choice is confirmed by
the realization of the economy. Utility maximization and rational expectations allow us
to identify equilibria for the average behavior of the population thorough a simple fixed
point argument: with homogeneous and fixed J , Brock and Durlauf (2001) show that
the model admits one or three equilibria. The same paper also addresses expectation
formation in a dynamic setting: in a discrete time model the expectation of the behavior
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of the population at time t is given by the realized behavior at time t − 1, i.e., agents’
expectations are backward looking and myopic. Equilibria of the system of difference
equations coincide with those of the static problem with rational expectations. In our
analysis instead we consider a continuous time dynamics with a continuous time Markov
chain governing both agents’ choices and their identity.
3 Choice and Identity Dynamics
Building on Blume and Durlauf (2003) and Barucci and Tolotti (2009), we propose a
dynamic decision process based on the maximization of the utility (1). Agents update
their decisions at random Poissonian times: when the Poissonian clock of the i− th agent
rings, he takes a decision according to his utility function and to his expectation of the
others’ behavior. Under this specification, the system evolves as a continuous time Markov
chain on the state space {−1; 1}I . We can study the system dynamics and its invariant
distributions that characterize the steady states and hence the equilibria of the system.
Indeed, we transpose the static probability (3) into a dynamic (instantaneous) probability
defined by
λωi (t) = lim
τ→0
1
τ
P (ωi(t+ τ) 6= ωi(t)|ω(t) ) = e−βωωi(t)(h+γJi(t)+αωsI(t)), i = 1, . . . , I, (4)
where now all the state variables are indexed with time and the expectation by agent i of
the behavior of the others (m¯ei ) has been substituted by the empirical mean
sI(t) :=
1
I
I∑
i=1
ωi(t). (5)
λi(t) represents the local rate of probability that agent i changes his choice between time
t and t+, given the state of the system sI(t) at time t. This model requires all agents to
share the same information at any time, in particular they know the statistical mean of
the choices of the entire population and therefore they observe the behavior of the others
instantaneously. We can also use
∑
j 6=i ωj(t) in place of sI(t), i.e., excluding ωi from the
mean, this only requires to multiply all λi’s by a constant term with no qualitative effects
on the dynamics of the model.
We can formally prove that (4) represents the continuous dynamic counterpart of
(3). According to (4) agents change their opinion at random times {τ in}n∈N such that
τ in − τ in−1 are exponentially distributed with mean 1/λi. At time τ in, agent i revises his
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choice according to a process driven by (3). For a more detailed discussion on this point,
see Barucci and Tolotti (2009).
We can rewrite (4) in a compact way omitting time dependency as
ωi 7→ −ωi with intensity λωi = e−βωωi(h+γJi+αωsI), (6)
where βω > 0 and Ji ∈ {−1,+1}. Let αω > 0 and γ > 0, the interpretation is as follows:
a positive and large value of sI or Ji = 1 imply a high probability for agent i to confirm
ωi = 1 or to switch from ωi = −1 to ωi = 1; if sI < 0 and Ji = −1, then there is a
high probability of choosing ωi = −1. In these cases, coherence and conformism go in the
same directions. Instead, if sI > 0 and Ji = −1 or sI < 0 and Ji = +1, then coherence
and conformism go in different directions. A non conformism attitude (αω < 0) induces
a different effect. Obviously an h > (<) 0 implies a high probability for agent i to choose
ωi = 1 (−1).
Identity of agent i is represented by the variable Ji = {−1, 1}. Identity is not a
constant, it varies over time and is influenced both by the agent’s behavior (ωi) and by
the behavior of the society (sI). We investigate identity formation directly in a dynamic
setting. Agents reconsider their identity at random time according to a dynamics similar
to (6), We assume a continuous time Markovian evolution for Ji, i = 1, ..., I. In particular,
we assume the following dynamics:
Ji 7→ −Ji with intensity λJi = e−βJJi((1−αJ )ωi+αJsI) (7)
where αJ ∈ [0, 1]. Let βJ > 0 (assuming a negative coefficient the interpretation is
reversed), according to (7) the probability that the agent changes his identity from −1
to +1 or that he confirms his identity +1 is the exponential (and therefore an increasing
function) of a convex linear combination of Jiωi and JisI . The first component says that
agent’s identity is driven by his behavior, not only identity affects the agent behavior as
shown in (1), also the agent behavior affects the identity, i.e., if ωi = 1 then there is a
high probability that Ji = 1 persists or that there is a switch from Ji = −1 to Ji = 1.
In this way we model an action driven identity (pure individualistic identity formation).
The second effect says that agent’s identity is driven by what the others do, not only the
behavior of the others affects the agent’s utility and his behavior as shown in (1), the
social behavior also affects the identity formation, i.e., if sI = 1(−1) then there is a high
probability that Ji = 1(−1). In this way we model a society driven identity. This second
effect is similar to the hypothesis of Akerlof (1980), where it is assumed that the fraction
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of the population believing in the code increases in the fraction of the population that
obeys the code.
Specifications as (6)-(7) make the state space variables evolve as a continuous time
Markov chain on {−1, 1}2N with the following infinitesimal generator
GIf(ω,J) =
I∑
i=1
λωi
(
f(ωi,J)− f(ω,J))+ I∑
i=1
λJi
(
f(ω,J i)− f(ω,J)) (8)
where ωi = (ω1, . . . , ωi−1,−ωi, ωi+1, . . . , ωI) (resp. J i) denotes the vector with a switched
i−th component.
In order to study the dynamics of the system induced by (8), we can rely on techniques
developed in Barucci and Tolotti (2009). Compared to Barucci and Tolotti (2009), despite
the common theoretical bases, it turns out that the derivation of the equations and the
corresponding equilibria is more complex.
Theorem 3.1. Consider the Markov process (ω(t),J(t))t≥0 with generator (8) and as-
sume that at time t = 0 the random variables (ωi(0), Ji(0)), i = 1, . . . , I, are independent
and identically distributed. Consider the following empirical means
sωI (t) =
1
I
∑
i
ωi(t), s
J
I :=
1
I
∑
i
Ji(t), s
ωJ
I :=
1
I
∑
i
ωi(t)Ji(t).
Then for I → ∞ the triplet (sωI (t), sJI (t), sωJI (t)) converges (in the sense of weak conver-
gence of stochastic processes) to a triplet m(t) = (mω(t),mJ(t),mωJ(t)) such that
m˙(t) = A(mω(t)) ·m(t)− b(mω(t)), (9)
where A(mω(t)) is a 3× 3 matrix and b(mω(t)) ∈ R3, both depending on mω(t) defined as
A(mω) = 2·

−C(a)C(b) C(a)S(b) −S(a)S(b)
C(c)S(d) −C(c)C(d) −S(c)S(d)
−S(a)S(b) + S(c)C(d) S(a)C(b)− S(c)S(d) −C(a)C(b)− C(c)C(d)

(10)
and the three dimensional vector
b(mω) = 2 ·

−S(a)C(b)
−S(c)C(d)
−C(a)S(b)− C(c)S(d)
 ,
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where S(x) = sinh(x), C(x) = cosh(x), T (x) = tanh(x) and
a = βωh+ βωαωmω
b = βωγ
c = βJαJmω
d = βJ(1− αJ) .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice that equation (9) simply says that the differential system leading the dynamics
of the triplet m(t) can be written as a generalized linear system in m(t) where the
coefficients explicitly depend on mω(t).
4 Stationary equilibria and comparative statics
Having established the dynamics of the infinite dimensional system, we can now look at
the steady states of the system.
We define A(k)(mω), k = 1, 2, 3 as the matrix where we substitute the k − th row of
A(mω) with b(mω). Now we are ready to state the Proposition that characterizes the
steady states of the system.
Proposition 4.1. Consider the dynamical system (9). Then the steady states (m¯ω, m¯J , m¯ωJ)
of the system are characterized by a fixed point argument:
m¯ω = F1(m¯
ω), (11)
where
F1(m
ω) =
|A(1)(mω)|
|A(mω)|
and m¯J = F2(m¯
ω), m¯ωJ = F3(m¯
ω), with Fk(m
ω) = |A
(k)(mω)|
|A(mω)| for k = 2, 3.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 4.1 suggests that the analysis of the stationary equilibria of the system can
be reduced to the study of the equation in one variable reported in (11). This is highly
nonlinear and therefore its solutions can only be obtained numerically.
We now provide an analysis of stationary equilibria, their stability and some com-
parative statics. In order to simplify the analysis, we restrict our attention to the case
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αω ∈ [0, 1] and γ = 1 − αω. This assumption puts an antisymmetric relation between
the identity driven component of the utility (represented by γ) and the conformism effect
(represented by αω). Thus, we are left with five parameters, see Table 1.
Table 1: The parameters and the aggregate variables of the model
Parameter Range Economic interpretation
h R preferability of ω = +1 over ω = −1
βω (0,∞) The noise level related to the choice of the agent
βJ (0,∞) The noise level related to the identity of the agent
αω [0, 1] The impact of conformism on the choice of the agents
αJ [0, 1] The impact of conformism on the identity of the agent
Variable
mω [−1, 1] The share of agents choosing ω = +1 (mω = 0 means half/half)
mJ [−1, 1] The share of agents with J = +1 (mJ = 0 means half/half)
mωJ [−1, 1] The share of agents for which ω = J (mωJ = 0 means half/half)
As far as stationary equilibria is concerned, equation (11) admits one or three solutions
depending on the values of the parameters (h, αω, βω, αJ , βJ). When the solution is unique,
it has the same sign of h. When there are three solutions, the two extreme ones have
opposite sign; in particular for h = 0, the two extreme equilibria are symmetric. Note
that mωJ > 0 means that a fraction of the population larger than 50% behaves coherently
with his identity, mωJ < 0 means that less than 50% of the population behaves coherently
with his identity.
When the stationary solution is unique, it is stable. When there are three equilibria,
the two extreme ones are stable and the intermediate one is always unstable. So with
multiple stationary equilibria there is a tendency towards a polarized society.
Analyzing the relationship between stationary equilibria and the parameters, we set
h = 0 which renders symmetric stationary equilibria. h > 0 (h < 0) simply amounts to a
de-symmetrization of the model towards ω = 1 (ω = −1). Existence of multiple equilibria
is driven by two key features: randomness measured by βω and βJ , the relevance of the
behavior of the aggregate economy on agent’s choice (measured by αω) and on his identity
(measured by αJ).
Small values of βω and/or βJ denote more randomness in agent’s choice and/or in
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the identity formation process that will eventually drive the dynamics of the system to a
(unique) stationary equilibrium in which (approximately) half of the agents chose ω = 1
and/or half of the population is characterized by the identity J = 1. The limiting case
βω = 0 (resp. βJ = 0) represents the case where exactly half of the agents choose ω = 1
(resp. are in the state J = 1). On the opposite, as in Brock and Durlauf (2001), a large
βJ or a large βω make the presence of multiple equilibria more likely.
αω and αJ measure the dependence among action, identity and the behavior of the
economy as a whole, i.e., conformism in the agent’s choice and in his identity. As αω
and/or αJ increase, the system is characterized by three stationary equilibria. The re-
sulting equilibrium is the positive or negative one, depending on the initial conditions.
This effect is not surprising, it confirms the result obtained in Brock and Durlauf (2001)
on the relation between conformism and agent’s choices and it extends the argument to
the relation between the behavior of the economy as a whole and agent’s identity. On the
contrary small values of αω and αJ induce a strict relation between action and identity
through the utility function and a role of the agent’s choice in forming his identity.
In equilibrium we may have coincidence or not between choice and identity. identity
of the population goes in the same direction as the aggregate behavior if mω = mJ = 0 or
mω and mJ have the same sign. Discrepancy between the agent’s choice and the identity
at the aggregate level is measured by |mω −mJ |, instead an index of discrepancy at the
agent level - the agent doesn’t behaves as his identity predicts - is provided by mωJ .
To provide the flavor of the comparative static results we analyze stationary equilibria
varying the parameters of the model. The values of the parameters in the different cases
are reported in Tables 2 and 3.
Case 1. Low values of betas and high values of alphas: large noise both in agent’s
choices and in their identity formation; identity doesn’t affect agent’s choices and agent’s
choice doesn’t affect his identity; only the behavior of the society as a whole affects choices
and identity. There is a unique stationary equilibrium with a completely randomized
society: the noise component of the utility dominates the conformism effect and agents
are perfectly dispersed both at the aggregate level and at the micro level, i.e., |mω−mJ | =
|0 − 0| = mωJ = 0, i.e., half of the population chooses ω = 1 and the identity of half of
the population is J = 1 but only half of the population acts coherently (i.e. J = ω).
Case 2. Low values of betas, small but positive 1−αω and 1−αJ : large noise both in
agent’s choices and in their identity formation; identity affects agent’s choices and agent’s
choice affects identity, but the behavior of the society as a whole plays a more significant
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Table 2: Comparative statics (1)
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
βω 1 1 2.5 2.5 2.5
βJ 1 1 2.5 2.5 2.5
αω 1 0.6 0 0.2 1
αJ 1 0.6 0 0.2 1
N.Eq. 1 1 1 3 3
mω 0 0 0 ± 0.13 / 0 ± 0.98 / 0
mJ 0 0 0 ± 0.13 / 0 ± 0.98 / 0
mωJ 0 0.28 0.98 0.96 0.97 / 0
effect both on choices and identity. There is a unique stationary equilibrium. A significant
fraction of agents follow their identity and synchronizes ω and J .
Case 3: High values of betas and αω = αJ = 0: little noise, irrelevance of the behavior
of the economy as a whole on agent’s choices/identity. There is a unique stationary
equilibrium. Here mωJ is next to the maximum value as no conformism/social interaction
implies dominance of identity on agent’s choice.
Case 4: High values of betas and positive (but small) αω, αJ : little noise, moderate
relevance of the behavior of the economy as a whole on agent’s choices/identity. There
are three stationary equilibria. There is still high concordance between ω and J in all the
stationary equilibria (mωJ next to one) but the society is “partially” polarized (positive
and negative equilibrium with small absolute value).
Case 5: High values of betas and alphas: small noise both in agent’s choices and in
their identity formation; identity doesn’t affect agent’s choices and agent’s choice doesn’t
affect his identity; only the behavior of the society as a whole affects choices and identity.
Strong conformism leads to “extreme” stationary equilibria. We have a strong concor-
dance between ω and J at the extreme equilibria (mωJ near to one). A society with
small noise in the utility function and strong conformism is characterized by a polarized
outcome and coherence.
Case 6-9: different degree of noise and of conformism. When noise and conformism are
high in identity formation or agent’s choice (case 7 and 8) there is a unique equilibrium;
in these cases there is coherence between choice and identity; the polarized effect of little
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Table 3: Comparative statics (2)
Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 Case 9 Case 10 Case 11
βω 2.5 2.5 0.1 0.1 1 2.5
βJ 0.1 0.1 2.5 2.5 2.5 1
αω 0.6 0 0.6 0 0.8 0.8
αJ 0 0.6 0 0.6 0.8 0.8
N.Eq. 3 1 1 1 3 3
mω ± 0.14 / 0 0 0 0 ± 0.5 / 0 ± 0.97 / 0
mJ ± 0.01 / 0 0 0 0 ± 0.81 / 0 ± 0.75 / 0
mωJ 0.5 0.85 0.85 0.5 0.52 / 0.33 0.75 / 0.33
noise and conformism is stronger on the choice than on the identity: in case 6 we have
three equilibria, in case 9 a unique equilibrium, uniqueness of the equilibrium is also
confirmed with αω = 1.
Case 10-11: strong conformism, little noise in the choice or in the identity formation
process. We have a polarized society with a coherent behavior. Little noise in the choice
renders a more polarized/coherent society.
The analysis provides us with the following main results.
Result 1. As noise in agent’s choices and/or identity formation decreases or conformism
in agent’s choices and/or identity formation increases we have multiple stationary equi-
libria (compare case 1 and 5 and case 3 and 5).
Result 2. With a lot of noise or little conformism in agent’s choices and identity
formation we have a unique stationary equilibrium with the individualistic outcome; the
difference is that noise leads to decoupling between choice and identity (case 1 and 2),
instead little conformism leads to a behavior coherent with the agent’s identity (case 3).
Result 3. With multiple equilibria, in equilibrium |mω| is increasing in αω and βω,
|mJ | is increasing in αJ and βJ (case 4 and 5).
Result 4. In equilibrium mωJ increases when αω and/or αJ decrease (case 1 and 2,
case 3 and 5), and when βω and/or βJ increase.
Result 5. In equilibrium |mω −mJ | is high when |βω − βJ | is high.
Result 6. Coherence between agent’s behavior and identity is observed with little noise
when there is no conformism (mixed-individualistic outcome), see case 3 and 4, and when
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there is strong conformism (polarized outcome), see case 5, 10 and 11.
Result 7. In a polarized society (multiple stationary equilibria), identity and choice
as a whole are coherent (sign(mω) = sign(mJ)) but |mω| > |mJ | if βω > βJ .
Result 8. Difference between choice and identity is driven by the precision of noise
int he choices (βω) or by by the identity conviction (βJ) rather than by the difference of
conformism of the two processes.
5 Utility driven identity
We consider the setting of Section 3 assuming that identity is driven by two components:
the behavior of the society (sI) and the private utility represented by h. Agents reconsider
their identity at random time according to a dynamics similar to (6). In particular, we
assume the following dynamics for the J component:
Ji 7→ −Ji with intensity µJi = e−βJJi((1−αJ )h+αJsI) (12)
The following result holds.
Corollary 5.1. Consider the dynamical system induced by (9) where now λJi in (8) is
replaced by µJi defined in (12). Then Proposition 4.1 still holds where the matrix A and
the vector b are now defined as
A(mω) =

−C(a)C(b) C(a)S(b) −S(a)S(b)
−C(c+ hd) 0 0
−S(a)S(b) + S(c+ hd) S(a)C(b) −C(a)C(b)− C(c+ d)
 (13)
b(mω) =

−S(a)C(b)
−S(c+ hd)
C(a)S(b)
 ,
where S(x) = sinh(x), C(x) = cosh(x) and
a = βωh+ βωαωmω
b = βωγ
c+ hd = βJαJmω + h · βJ(1− αJ) .
Proof. The Corollary can be proved arguing in the same way as in Proposition 4.1
with slightly modifications in the calculation due to the change in the jump intensity of
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the J component. It only remains to ensure that the determinant of A is non zero. A
straightforward computation shows that
det(A) = C(c+ hd) · [C(a)2C(b)S(b)(T (a)2 − 1)− C(a)S(b)C(c+ hd)] .
Being C(x) > 0, T (x)2 < 1 for all x and S(b) > 0, the determinant is strictly negative.
Table 4: Comparative statics - Utility driven identity
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
h 0 0 0 0.3 0.3
βω 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
βJ 2.5 2.5 1 1 1
αω 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.8 1
αJ 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.8 1
N.Eq. 1 3 3 1 3
mω 0 ± 0.52 / 0 ± 0.97 / 0 0.99 -0.91 / -0.54 / 0.99
mJ 0 ± 0.47 / 0 ± 0.65 / 0 0.77 -0.54 / -0.24 / 0.86
mωJ 0.76 0.90 / 0.76 0.65 / 0.24 0.77 0.50 / 0.13 / 0.86
Comparative static results are similar to those obtained in the previous section. In
Table 4 we discuss the cases analyzed in the previous Section considering h = 0 and h 6= 0.
The main difference with respect to the model analyzed in the previous Section is that
an agent whose identity is driven by his private utility (h) is more likely to behave in
an individualistic way. To have multiple stationary equilibria we need a higher degree of
conformism in choice/identity compared to the case analyzed in the previous section. The
effect is made clear by case 1 and 2 in Table 4 and case 4 in 2: with the same parameters
the economy with identity driven by ideology is characterized by multiple equilibria and
those stationary do not correspond to agents’ private preferences. The rationale is that in
this setting we have a more relevant role of fundamental value associated with the choice.
Considering case 3 and 4 in Table 4 we observe that with a zero private utility differ-
ential we have multiple stationary equilibria, assuming h 6= 0 we have a unique stationary
equilibrium. To observe multiple equilibria, we need to increase αω and αJ , see case 5.
Notice that when h 6= 0, equilibria are no longer symmetric.
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6 Voting when voters like to win
We apply our analysis to sequential voting. Agents choose between two candidates/parties
(+1 and −1). We consider a common value setting a’ la Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)
with incomplete information, agents vote sequentially observing a private signal about
the value of the two candidates. Voters vote sequentially in a random order. As agent
i is selected to vote, he first observes a private signal about who is the better candidate
(²i(+1)− ²i(−1)): if v(+1)+ ²i(+1)− v(−1)− ²i(−1) > 0 he votes for candidate +1. The
voting system is peculiar, voters may change their vote and the competition ends when
an equilibrium is reached.
The sequential structure of voting systems has been investigated in the literature
considering the tradeoff between efficiency (aggregation of information) and momentum
(voting bandwagon) with departure from the individualistic behavior; in the first case
the better candidate wins the election, in the second case the winner may not be the
better candidate. The equilibrium is efficient (informative) if sign(mω) = sign(h). We
follow Callander (2007, 2008) assuming that voters possess a desire to conform with the
majority. Their analysis shows that as long as the desire to vote for the winner is non-zero
a bandwagon will ultimately begin, see Hung and Plott (2001), Dasgupta et al. (2007)
for experimental results. The bandwagon threshold that induces the voter to follow the
vote of the majority independently of their signal is decreasing in the degree of voter to
be in the winning majority.
We enrich the setting assuming that each voter is also endowed with an ideology (Ji).
We consider the interplay between ideology and desire to vote with the winning majority
(conformism), measured by αω. In this setting βJ provides an index of the ideological
conviction. The agent gets a benefit by voting in agreement with his signal, his ideology
and the majority. Our analysis developed in the previous sections sheds some interesting
results with respect to previous studies. We summarize the results as follows:
1. Bandwagons/departure from the true value of the candidates (informative equilib-
rium) are more likely when private signals on the value of the candidates are precise.
2. Strong ideological conviction and imprecise private information signals lead to the
informative equilibrium.
3. When signals on the value of the candidates are precise and conformism high
(either on choices or on ideology), the informative equilibrium (the one that coincides
with the individualistic outcome) is not stable and we observe a polarized vote with a
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Figure 1: Dynamics of mω(t) (solid) and mJ(t) (dash-dot), with parameters as in Case 6
of Table 3. The time horizon is short (T = 50 days) on the left panel and long (T = 600
days) on the right.
large majority (bandwagon).
4. We may have a large majority in a society with a weak ideological conviction when
private signals are precise and conformism is strong.
5. There is coherence between ideology and vote with little noise both at the infor-
mative equilibrium (weak conformism) or in a bandwagon with a large majority (strong
conformism).
Relying on our model is it also possible to analyze the dynamics of the system. The
dynamics of sequential vote may be peculiar with a tight competition for a long time
before convergence to one (stable) equilibrium. To illustrate this point we provide a
numerical example. We look at the model with parameters as described in case 6 of
Table 4. As already discussed, in this case we have a society whose citizens are at any
stable equilibrium almost equally divided between the two major parties mJ ≈ 0 from
an ideological viewpoint, but where a significant part of the voters chooses one of the
two parties because of a bandwagon effect. In the numerical example we have chosen the
negative equilibrium mω = −0.14.
In Figure 1 we analyze a trajectory of the pair (mω(t),mJ(t)) where we have chosen as
initial values mω(0) = 0.05 and mJ(0) = −0.055. In the two panels we compare the short
horizon behavior and the long run behavior of the society. In particular we see that the
trajectory is initially driven towards the unstable equilibrium (mω = 0, mJ = 0), see
Figure 1.a where we have taken T = 50 as final horizon (assume t is the number of days
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under account). The stable equilibrium is reached only after a considerable transition
time, see Figure 1.b where we consider T = 600, i.e. almost two years.
7 Conclusions
Social interaction is a complex issue. In this paper we have provided a model to analyze
social interaction when agents are affected both by the behavior of the society as a whole
and by their identity. We may have a polarized society with a deep departure from the
outcome with individualistic behavior. Conformism induces this phenomenon, identity
drives towards the private utility outcome provided that identity is affected by the agent’s
choices or private utility.
A polarized outcome is observed mainly when there is little noise in choices, i.e., private
signals are precise, or in identity formation, i.e., agents have a strong conviction in their
identity. A polarized outcome is usually accompanied by coherence between choice and
identity, i.e., choice and identity go in the same direction.
A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Notice that this theorem is twofold. On one hand it ensures convergence of the I
dimensional empirical process to an infinite dimensional one. On the other hand, it char-
acterizes the infinite dimensional process by means of the deterministic three dimensional
system given by (9).
The proof of the convergence part of the theorem follows directly from the proof of
Theorem 3.1 and Theorem A.1 in Barucci and Tolotti (2009) with minor modifications in
the functions involved. We thus refer the reader to that theorem.
The convergence part of the theorem, ensures the existence of a limiting process
m(t) = (mω(t),mJ(t),mωj(t)). We still have to show that m(t) solves (9).
One of the consequences of Theorem 3.1 in Barucci and Tolotti (2009) is that we can
rewrite m(t) = (mω(t),mJ(t),mωj(t)) as follows:
mω(t) =
∑
ω,J=±1
ωqt(ω, J), m
J(t) =
∑
ω,J=±1
Jqt(ω, J), m
ωJ(t) =
∑
ω,J=±1
ωJqt(ω, J); (14)
where (qt){t∈[0,T ]} is family of measures such that for all t ∈ [0, T ]
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q˙t = ∇ω
[
e−β
ωω(h+γJ+αωmω(t)) · qt(ω, J)
]
+∇J
[
eβ
JJ ((1−αJ )ω+αJmω(t)) · qt(ω, J)
]
(15)
with (ω, J) ∈ {−1; 1}2 and where ∇xf(x, y) = f(−x, y)− f(x, y).
To simplify the notations, in what follows we shall write mt in place of m(t).
Relying on (14) and (15), it is possible to prove that
m˙ωt = −2C(βωh+ βωαωmωt )C(βωγ)mωt + 2C(βωh+ βωαωmωt )S(βωγ)mJt
−2S(βωh+ βωαωmωt )S(βωγ)mωJt + 2S(βωh+ βωαωmωt )C(βωγ)
m˙Jt = +2S(β
J(1− αJ))C(βJαJmωt )mωt − 2C(βJ(1− αJ))C(βJαJmωt )mJt
−2S(βJ(1− αJ))S(βJαJmωt )mωJt + 2C(βJ(1− αJ))S(βJαJmωt )
m˙ωJt = −2[S(βωh+ βωαωmωt )S(βωγ)− C(βJ(1− αJ))S(βJαJmωt )]mωt
+2[S(βωh+ βωαωmωt )C(β
ωγ)− S(βJ(1− αJ))S(βJαJmωt )]mJt
−2[C(βωh+ βωαωmωt )C(βωγ) + C(βJ(1− αJ))C(βJαJmωt )]mωJt
+2[C(βωh+ βωαωmωt )S(β
ωγ) + S(βJ(1− αJ))C(βJαJmωt )].
(16)
where C(x) = cosh(x) and S(x) = sinh(x).
The definitions of A(mω(t)) and b(mω(t)), given in (10), immediately follow from (16).
To show the validity of (16), considermω(t) =
∑
ω,J ωqt(ω, J), hence m˙
ω
t =
∑
ω,J ωq˙t(ω, J).
Relying on (15) we have
m˙ωt =
∑
ω,J
ω
(
∇ω [e−βωω(h+γJ+αωmωt )q(ω, J)]+∇J [e−βJJ((1−αJ )ω+αJmωt )q(ω, J)]) =
=
∑
ω,J
ω
(
eβ
ωω(h+γJ+αωmωt )qt(−ω, J)− e−βωω(h+γJ+αωmωt )qt(ω, J)
)
+
+
∑
ω,J
ω
(
eβ
JJ((1−αJ )ω+αJmωt )qt(ω,−J)− e−βJJ((1−αJ )ω+αJmωt )qt(ω, J)
)
.
We now use the following facts∑
ω,J
ωeβ
ωω(h+γJ+αωmωt )qt(−ω, J) = −
∑
ω,J
ωe−β
ωω(h+γJ+αωmωt )qt(ω, J),
∑
ω,J
ωeβ
JJ((1−αJ )ω+αJmωt )qt(ω,−J) =
∑
ω,J
ωe−β
JJ((1−αJ )ω+αJmωt )qt(ω, J).
So that
m˙ωt = −2
∑
ω,J
ωe−β
ωω(h+γJ+αωmωt )qt(ω, J).
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Moreover, it is easy to check that for ω, J ∈ {−1;+1}, it holds
e−β
ωω(h+αωmωt ) = −ωe
βω(h+αωmωt ) − e−βω(h+αωmωt )
2
+
eβ
ω(h+αωmωt ) + e−β
ω(h+αωmωt )
2
,
e−β
ωωγJ = −ωJ e
βωγ − e−βωγ
2
+
eβ
ωγ + e−β
ωγ
2
.
Using the definitions S(x) = sinh(x) = e
x−e−x
2
and C(x) = cosh(x) = e
x+e−x
2
, we have
m˙ωt = −2
∑
ω,J
ω[−ωS(βωh+βωαωmωt )+C(βωh+βωαωmωt )][−ωJS(βωγ)+C(βωγ)]qt(ω, J).
Now, using the fact that ω2 = 1 and (14), it follows that
m˙ωt = −2C(βωh+ βωαωmωt )C(βωγ)mωt + 2C(βωh+ βωαωmωt )S(βωγ)mJt
−2S(βωh+ βωαωmωt )S(βωγ)mωJt + 2S(βωh+ βωαωmωt )C(βωγ).
A similar argument is used to compute m˙Jt and m˙
ωJ
t .
Proof of Proposition 4.1.
Being (m¯ω, m¯J , m¯ωJ) the steady states of (9), they solve A(mω)m = b(mω).
The proposition then follows from the classical Cramer’s Theorem on linear systems,
once we ensure that the determinant of A(mω) is non zero. We distinguish two cases:
a) T (b) ≥ T (d).
In this case we operate a manipulation (we omit the details) on the rows of the matrix
obtaining:
A˜ =

−1 T (b) −T (a)T (b)
0 T (b)T (d)− 1 −T (d)(T (c) + T (a)T (b))
0 a23 a33

where {
a23 = S(a)C(b)− S(c)S(d)− T (b)S(a)S(b) + T (b)S(c)C(d);
a33 = −C(a)C(b)− C(c)C(d)− T (a)T (b)(−S(a)S(b) + S(c)C(d)) .
All the operations used in order to transform A into A˜ are preserving the rank. Then
det(A) is non zero as soon as det(A˜) is non zero. We now have
det(A˜) = −{a33 · [T (b)T (d)− 1] + a23 · [T (c)T (d) + T (a)T (b)T (d)]} .
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Consider now mω and h non negative. In this case, all the hyperbolic functions are non
negative. Moreover, T (b)T (d) < 1. A tedious calculation shows that a23 ≥ 0 and a33 < 0.
Thus det(A˜) < 0.
b) T (b) < T (d).
As before we transform A obtaining:
A¯ =

T (d) −1 −T (c)T (d)
0 T (b)T (d)− 1 −T (d)(T (c) + T (a)T (b))
0 a23 a33

where{
a23 = T (d)S(a)C(b)− T (d)S(c)S(d)− S(a)S(b) + S(c)C(d);
a33 = −T (d)C(a)C(b)− T (d)C(c)C(d) + T (c)T (d)(−S(a)S(b) + S(c)C(d)) .
We now have
det(A˜) = T (d) · {a33 · [T (b)T (d)− 1] + a23 · [T (c)T (d) + T (a)T (b)T (d)]} .
Consider now mω and h non negative. In this case, all the hyperbolic functions are
non negative. Moreover, T (b)T (d) < 1. A tedious calculation shows that a23 > 0 and
a33 < 0. Thus det(A¯) > 0. Similar arguments are used for different values of m
ω and h.
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